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Reassessing social policies in
Latin America:
Growth, middle classes and
social rights
Andrés Solimano
This paper examines the analytical bases of social policy in Latin
America, as illustrated by empirical data. It finds that the dominant approach
is based on the following premises: (i) economic growth is the primary
mechanism for poverty reduction; (ii) social expenditure should focus
mainly on the really poor; (iii) private-sector provision of education, health
and pension services should be encouraged; and (iv) emergency social
protection programmes are needed to deal with macroeconomic crises
and natural disasters. The article then identifies areas in which social policy
can be renewed, such as income distribution, attention to the middle class
as a target of social policies, possibilities for the poor and middle classes
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I
Introduction
Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean
in the past two decades has been modest and volatile.
In fact, average per capita income growth was close to
a half per cent per year in 1980-2004, and 44% of the
population of the region, or around 220 million people,
were estimated to live below the poverty line in 2002
(ECLAC 2003). This weak economic performance and
insufficient social progress in the region are raising
questions about the adequacy of economic and social
policies being applied in the region by the national
authorities, policies which during the last decade and a
half or so have been largely inspired by the blueprint
of the “Washington Consensus”.
The combination of slow growth and persistent
inequality has yielded chronic poverty and social
disarray despite the fact that the dominant concern in
the past decade has been poverty reduction. Other social
objectives such as reducing inequality of income and
wealth or promoting empowerment and popular
participation have not been, on the whole, policy
priorities. The bet on growth-driven poverty reduction
has been a disappointment in most Latin American
countries, perhaps with the exception of Chile during
the 1990s. Only countries with steady and very rapid
growth –such as China and India– can show real gains
in getting people out of poverty, something that has
remained elusive in most of Latin America in the last
quarter of a century Even if rapid growth is possible, it
is “filtered” by its employment intensity and by
inequality levels in its final effects on poverty. In turn,
the State’s ability to reduce poverty and inequality will
depend on various factors such as its own capacity to
raise revenues that can finance social spending, on its
administrative capacity to conduct social policy and on
the political will of the authorities to improve the
situation of the poorest and other less affluent groups
in society.
New approaches are being developed that attempt
to pose the problem of economic development and
social policy in terms of human rights, including social
and economic rights. Economists are trained to think
in terms of incentives, constraints, scarcity and the
ability of economic systems to create (or destroy)
wealth. In contrast, philosophers focus more on rights,
values and the ethical underpinnings of alternative
social arrangements. Political scientists and
sociologists, in turn, highlight the importance of social
contracts and social cooperation for attaining certain
social goals. Marrying these different perspectives is
not easy, although it is needed for broadening our
perspectives on social and economic policies. A new
view in this direction is the rights-based development
(RBD) approach that draws from different strands of
social thinking. This view assumes that individuals –as
citizens, consumers and producers – have a set of
economic, social and political rights that cannot be
separated. Economic policy should foster an
environment that generates wealth as the required
material base for those rights to be satisfied.
Development is not only an economic problem,
however; it also has a political component. The
satisfaction of individual wants and rights depends on
resource availability and existing power structures,
which affect the actual income distribution and the
enforcement of economic and civic rights.
This paper reviews the main guiding principles of
social policy in vogue since the 1990s and their links
with economic policies in Latin America, and it
examines the extent to which the new literature on rights
and development can shed light on the design of
renewed social policies to overcome the deficiencies
and shortcomings of current policies.
The paper is divided into in five sections, including
this introduction. Section II gives an overview of the
evolution of social and economic policies in Latin
America in past decades. Focusing on current policies,
the paper discusses the three centerpieces of the
prevailing approach, namely, (i) growth-led poverty
reduction, (ii) targeting and (iii) private sector
participation in the management and delivery of social
services. Section III looks briefly at the theoretical
literature on rights and development, including
(conservative) libertarians (Nozick), liberals (Rawls)
and more eclectic authors such as Amartya Sen and
This paper was produced for a meeting on human rights and
development, held on 9 and 10 December 2004, at ECLAC
headquarters in Santiago, Chile. The author would like to thank
Juliana Pungiluppi for the helpful discussions they had on the
subject.
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others. The relationships between rights, resources and
economic growth, on the one hand, and rights,
institutions and political regimes on the other are also
examined. Section IV identifies some alternatives to
current social policies in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Targeting of social benefits on the “really
poor” as a policy principle is evaluated in terms of two
criteria: (i) its demanding informational requirements
for successful implementation and (ii) the political
problems posed by separating the groups that are
benefited by targeted policies from those who pay for
those benefits (through taxes). This section discusses
the possibilities of moving to broader policies in which
the benefits of social policies are more “universal”– at
least reaching the middle class, as a stabilizing segment
in any society. It also considers several effects of
partially privatized health, education and social security
systems in terms of replicating current inequality and
social segmentation in the access to social benefits and
services. The paper then examines the potential of asset
accumulation by the poor and the middle class in
housing, education, capital and land as a mechanism
to equalize opportunities, to promote social mobility
in stratified societies and to realize the hidden saving
and productive potential of economically excluded
groups that can lead to higher growth. The paper closes
in section V with some remarks about social contracts
in Latin America.
II
Social policy in Latin America:
a brief overview
Under the development strategy of import substitution,
in place from the 1930s to the 1980s, the main
objectives were social modernization and the training
of human resources needed by the industrialization
process and the growing State. The instruments used
for this purpose were: the expansion of education at
various levels, including higher education (universities);
housing policies to cope with a growing urban
population; national public health systems; and pay-
as-you-go social security. Labour market policies
included legislation on minimum wages, severance
payments and restrictions on firing and hiring by firms
to ensure job stability of (incumbent) workers. Land
reform was also implemented in some countries in an
attempt to correct the highly concentrated pattern of
land tenure that characterized most Latin American
countries. The social constituency behind these policies
consisted of trade unions, various civil society
organizations in the public and private sectors and rural
workers.
Until the late 1970s this development strategy cum
social policy delivered economic growth and a degree
of social modernization. However, the economic
model also involved micro-inefficiencies associated
with import protection and the growth of the public
sector. The debt crisis of the early 1980s an its legacy
of inflation, fiscal deficits, exchange rate instability
and debt servicing problems led to a change in the
development model in Latin America. Criticism of the
economic model of import substitution was also
extended to its associated social model. Main critical
elements of the latter were: (i) social spending was
not necessarily reaching the most needy in urban and
rural areas; (ii) the subsidies on certain basic goods,
such as foodstuffs, were fiscally expensive; (iii) public
universities, often tuition free, implicitly subsidized
the children of rich households and the upper middle
class; and (iv) the social security system based on pay-
as-you go delivered low pensions and did not
contribute to the development of domestic capital
markets.
Market-oriented economic reforms included
policies of macroeconomic stabilization, external
opening, financial liberalization, privatization and
market deregulation. These policies started to be
implemented in the mid-1980s in many Latin American
countries (Chile did so in the mid-1970s under the
Pinochet regime). The corresponding social policies in
the 1990s had the following main features:
(i)The main social objective was poverty reduction
led by faster economic growth following the adoption
of market-based reforms. The reduction of wealth and
income inequality was absent as a policy priority, in
contrast to several previous experiments with income
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and wealth redistribution that took place in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s in the region (Solimano, 1998)1 .
(ii) Social policies focused on assisting the most
vulnerable segments of the population (the poor, the
elderly, children, the disabled), according to the
principle of “targeting”. Targeting was complemented
by social emergency funds oriented to provide support
income and public works programmes to low-income
groups in the wake of severe macro-economic crises or
natural disasters.
(iii) Market mechanisms and relative prices were
supposed to guide resource allocation, savings and
investment. Social policies would have to avoid
distorting relative prices through the use of price
subsidies for basic consumer goods.
(iv) The private sector had an important role to play
in the delivery of education, health and pensions as a
natural corollary of market-based development in other
areas of the economy.
(v) Labour market policies also changed in the
direction of seeking more “flexibility”. Firing rules were
relaxed, severance payments reduced and minimum
wages de-emphasized as an income support policy.
A full evaluation of the results of these economic
and social policies is beyond the scope of this paper.2
However, the results of social and development policies
for the region as a whole are not encouraging in terms
of rapid and sustained growth, poverty reduction and
lower inequality. Tables A.1 to A.7 in annex A show
various indicators of poverty, inequality, social spending
and GDP growth for Latin America. This evidence shows
broadly a strong deterioration of social indicators
(poverty and others) in the 1980s and a certain
subsequent recovery, although the social situation
remains fragile and critical as measured by current
levels of poverty (tables A.1 and A.2) and other
indicators. Inequality persists in the region (table A.3).
Modest increases in real incomes and sluggish but
volatile growth occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (tables
A.4 and A.7). Several growth crises took place during
the last two decades that destroyed jobs and increased
poverty (Solimano, 2005a).
The existing evidence seems to suggest an unequal
access to education and health services by low-income
groups and the middle class compared to the upper
middle class and the wealthy (ECLAC, 2004). The reality
in some countries of Latin America today is that of a
private system that offers better quality education and
health services (although often below the quality
standards of advanced countries) to the upper middle
class and the affluent co-existing with a poorly funded
public education and health systems. The quality of
education is segmented geographically and by income
levels (better education is often found in urban than
rural areas and in more affluent neighbourhoods than
in poor ones). Moreover, international tests of
educational performance in Latin American countries
often show significant differences between private and
public schools.
In the health sector, public hospitals are often
under-funded, and queuing time for patients is routine.
In Chile, in recent years, thousands of families have
left the private health insurance system of ISAPRES
(private health providers) and switched to the State-
run National Health Fund (FONASA) system because of
the escalation of costs in the private system and the
limited coverage of the services offered.3  Colombia,
Brazil and other Latin American countries have also
introduced a growing role for private providers of health
services.
1 The cases of Cuba in the early 1960s, Chile under Allende in the
early 1970s, and Nicaragua in the 1980s under the Sandinistas were
the most radicalized experiments of asset redistribution. More gradual
policies with a redistributive bend were implemented in Chile under
Frei Montalva, in Costa Rica and in Uruguay among others.
2 See ECLAC (2003) and Birdsall and Szekely (2003) for an analysis
of the social situation and social policies in Latin America.
3 See Solimano and Pollack (2005).
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III
The literature on rights and development:
basic elements
The previous discussion on the social situation in Latin
America could be framed also in terms of economic
and social rights. Nearly 45% of the region’s population
is living below the poverty line (about 220 million
people). This shows a clearly unsatisfactory effort to
promote the economic and social rights of a significant
part of the population that is unable to earn the
minimum level of income needed to meet certain basic
needs (food, clothing, transportation, housing, etc).
Moreover, it is undeniable that the poor and some
segments of the middle class do not have access to good
health services, high-quality education or decent
pensions.4
The literature on rights classifies the latter as
(i) political and civic rights (i.e., the right to free speech,
freedom of the press, right to be elected to office,
right to due process, right of free movement) and
(ii) economic and social rights (i.e., the right to work
and to receive education, health services, a decent
pension and economic security). In judging social
orders, liberal authors such as John Rawls in his Theory
of Justice have sought a criterion in which the principles
of justice could be made independent of original
positions in terms of wealth and political power. Thus,
the resulting social contract should be not affected by
these original positions, in order to ensure fairness.
Rawls calls for a “veil of ignorance” in which each
individual negotiating the social contract is ignorant of
his or her own material interests and of the endowments
of the other negotiators (wealth, talent, social
connections or other attributes) that may bias the design
of that contract’s standards, rules and institutions. Rawls
then assumes a set of social arrangements (institutions)
that give greater benefits to the least well-off compared
to any other alternative arrangement to ensure justice
and fairness. Rawls also points out the primacy of
certain political rights, such as liberty, over the
attainment of economic and social rights, should both
sets of rights enter in conflict (Solimano, 1998;
Solimano, Aninat and Birdsall, 2000).
Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State and Utopia,
adopts a more radical view on the primacy of liberty
(Nozick, 1974). In his view, personal liberty, as a case
of “self-ownership” or personal sovereignty, and
property rights take absolute priority over “economic
rights”, irrespective of the consequences of exercising
these rights. The “minimal State” proposed by Nozick
and the libertarian approach must protect property rights
and personal security, but it must abstain from any
income redistribution through taxation or other
compulsory means, as that would constitute a threat to
property rights and the freedom of individuals to
dispose of the fruits of their efforts and the return on
their assets in any way they wish, without State
interference (the self-ownership thesis).5
Rawls’s position on the preeminence of political
rights (personal freedom) over economic or social rights
has been questioned in cases of severe economic needs
such as hunger and deprivation, which can be a matter
of life or death (Hart, 1973). More recently, Amartya
Sen, in Development as Freedom, mentions that “the
priority of liberty” has to be qualified in the sense that
the demand for personal liberty should not have the
effect of allowing economic needs to be overlooked
(Sen, 1999). In turn, regarding the issue of “just
institutions”, the neo-Marxist approach (or analytical
Marxism)6  questions the feasibility of devising just
institutions under the conditions of concentrated
ownership of private property that characterize
capitalism. These authors question the (Rawlsian)
device of the veil of ignorance and the original position
in which enlightened legislators and politicians devise
such institutions, and they point out that institutions
generally serve the economic and political interests of
those that design and run them.
4 It is apparent that the progress in assuring political rights in Latin
America following the transition from military governments in the
1970s and 1980s to civilian elected governments has not been
matched by an equal fulfillment of social and economic rights.
5 For an alternative analysis of the self-ownership thesis from a
neo-Marxist perspective, see Cohen (1995).
6 Exponents of “analytical Marxism” are G.A. Cohen (1985),
Roemer (1989,), Olin Wright (1998) and others; see Gargarello
(1999).
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A new perspective on social policy is that of rights-
based development,7  which sees individuals more as
citizens with rights and duties than as consumers facing
purely economic choices, although the two concepts
need not be antagonistic. In this approach, the citizenry
is composed of empowered people who actively
participate in the design and oversight of the
development projects and social programmes affecting
them. Government and development agencies are seen
as responsive to the claims of citizens for the delivery
of social services. Accountability is critical in this
approach. In addition, this approach views human rights
as indivisible: economic, social, civic, political and
cultural rights are seen as all inherent to the dignity of
every person, and therefore they cannot be separated
(Ackerman, 2004). This approach also put emphasis
on the importance of power structures in society in
explaining patterns of poverty and exclusion. Certain
power structures –those which are more democratic,
participatory and accountable– foster the protection of
rights while other structures tend to dampen or deny
their realization.
It should be noted that the fulfilment of rights
assumes the existence of resources and institutional
facilities or, in general, an effective democratic regime
and social policy institutions that deliver the good or
service implied by certain rights. Consequently, rights
have an economic dimension as well as institutional
and political scope.
1. Rights, resources and growth
When dealing with rights issues, economists
instinctively focus on the resources needed to deliver
the service or good deriving from a certain right. Trained
to see the economic problem as “the allocation of scarce
resources to multiple needs” (as defined by Lionel
Robbins), the economist will point out the trade-offs
involved in ensuring the enjoyment of various economic
and social rights. Alternative ends compete for
resources. For example, more resources devoted to
health care will compete with the resources allocated
to education or pensions. In turn, the financing of social
services often involves taxation, lowering the return on
productive assets and potentially hampering the process
of economic growth and wealth creation.
Libertarian theory, with its emphasis on property
rights, gives absolute priority to wealth creation,
although it is unclear that it takes only the protection
of property rights for wealth creation to automatically
flourish. A certain level of social equity and cohesion
are also needed to give stability and credibility to the
rules of the game. In contrast, liberal political theory
seeks to balance economic and social rights with private
property and political freedom. In practice this view
provides the theoretical underpinnings for social-
democratic capitalism. The economic correlate of Rawls
in public policy is the welfare State, or a “developmental
State” that taxes property and incomes to finance social
expenditure and guarantee social benefits and social
protection. The welfare state in Europe and the
developmental State in Latin America and East Asia
have historically used the instruments of taxes, transfers,
regulation and public provision of education, health and
pensions to provide the physical and human
infrastructure needed by any economic system to
operate. In addition, these policies, with all their
limitations, serve as an instrument of social protection
and training of human resources. From the standpoint
of required conditions for wealth creation, the recent
literature indicates that inequality can harm capital
accumulation and productivity growth by various means,
such as social polarization, higher taxation and the
deterioration of capital-labour relations (Solimano, 1998).8
2. Rights, institutions and political regimes
Rights are closely linked to political regimes,
institutions and social movements.9  Historically, the
7 See Hausermann (1998), Ferguson (1999), Ackerman (2004),
Nankani (2004) and Alsop and Norton, (2004).
8 Centrally planned socialism is now discredited, as its historical
record shows that the attainment of economic and social rights
around the project of an egalitarian society required the virtual
elimination of private property rights and a severe restriction of
the political rights and freedoms that characterize a democracy.
The economic result of the experiment, after an initial period of
resource extensive growth, was stagnation and eventual economic
collapse followed by political disintegration in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Social policy, under socialism, provided
a high level of social protection around a modest standard of living.
9 The concept of human rights and their implementation is the result
of an evolutionary process. Voting rights have changed over time. In
the nineteenth century, only people with a certain level of wealth
could vote. Women’s right to vote came after men’s. Economic and
social rights also evolved over time. Social security in the United
Sates and the United Kingdom were instituted in response to the
economic hardship people had to endure during the Great Depression
and the Second World War. Implicit in the creation of these institutions
was the belief that people had the right to at least a basic income
level regardless of whether they were employed or not, and that the
elderly could not be left to their own fate after a life of work. The
point we want to emphasize here is that rights are a “social
construction” that combines values, beliefs and social institutions.
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movement towards political rights, supported by labour
unions, social organizations of various kinds and left-
wing political parties, can be seen as associated with
the expansion of democracy. Political rights such
freedom of speech, of forming political parties and of
participating in elections, and civil rights such as
freedom of association, assembly and demonstration,
together with independent media and courts and
religious freedom, are all part of the definition of a
democracy (Yi Feng, 2003). So when we talk about
political rights we implicitly refer to a specific type of
political regime: democracy. In the case of economic
and social rights, the relationship with the political
regime is less direct, in principle. A right-wing
authoritarian regime may defend property rights –an
economic right– but at the same time deny civil rights
and political freedoms. In turn, a classic socialist regime
may enshrine social rights to education, employment,
health and others but at the same time restrict property
rights and political freedoms. Thus, although the
concept of “indivisibility of rights” sounds appealing
as a general principle, in practice the fulfillment of
certain rights has been historically conditioned by the
prevailing political regime.
There are various connections between democracy
and the fulfillment of economic and social rights. Sen
calls attention to the fact that famines tend to be avoided
in democracies but tend to occur in non-democratic
systems (Sen, 1999). In the African context, this author
mentions that in the late 1970s and early 1980s famines
occurred in Ethiopia and Sudan but were avoided in
Botswana and Zimbabwe. At the time, the common
factor in all four countries was a decline in food
production; the difference was, according to the author,
that in Botswana and Zimbabwe mechanisms of
political accountability and an independent press forced
authorities to prevent famines that, if they had occurred,
could have been very damaging to the authorities at
the time of elections. Those conditions apparently were
not present in the former two countries.
The enforcement of rights involves an “agency
problem”. There is a beneficiary (principal), and there
must be an institution (agent) to provide that beneficiary
with the good or service. The right to health care, for
example, necessitates an institution that provides health
services; otherwise that right will represent a moral
category devoid of operational content. The new
literature on rights stresses the need to empower the
beneficiaries of social services to demand better services
and participate in the design, provision and evaluation
of these services. The main purpose of the new social
policies is to abandon paternalistic practices in the
provision of social services and empower beneficiaries
to demand social accountability from the authorities.10
10 Ackerman (2004) reviews four case studies of social
accountability initiatives in social projects in Bangalore, India,
Malawi, Indonesia and Peru. Some of these projects are funded
and managed by non-governmental organizations or receive
support from the World Bank. These social accountability
initiatives are structured around “citizen scorecards”, “community
scorecards” and “social accountability systems”. This
methodology seeks to evaluate the degree of the recipients’
satisfaction with the quality of social services such as public
transport, telephone systems, electricity, water, waste disposal and
others provided by the State at national, regional and local levels.
The Ackerman study evaluates the scorecard methodologies from
a “human rights perspective”. This perspective is certainly more
demanding than “simple” consumer satisfaction. In fact, the
consumer bias of standard focus group exercises must be replaced
by the concept of the citizen, endowed with rights and duties.
Likewise, “consumer feedback” is to be extended to the
accountability of public agencies, making them responsible for
delivering social services in an effective and transparent way. In
addition, social participation is to be fostered and power structures
identified. The approach also calls attention to the need for citizens
to organize to increase the impact of their voice in a forceful way
and to influence the delivery of social services in a way consistent
with citizens’ rights.
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IV
Options for Latin America:
new criteria for social policy
New and more balanced social polices for Latin
America should recognize broader goals and a greater
variety of instruments. Bringing the concept of social
rights and rights-based development into the picture
can help to reform current policies, provided that due
attention is given to issues of resource-generation
(essentially through economic growth), the devising of
adequate social institutions that will carry out reformed
social policies and the nurturing of public
accountability, connecting beneficiaries with policy
makers and agencies in charge of social policy. We can
identify at least four areas in which social policies can
be broadened:
(i) Define the right to a universal “minimum
welfare level”. In practice, this would ensure a level of
income (or its equivalent in kind, such as food and other
essential goods and social services) that meets the basic
needs of all the population. The minimum income must
be defined in per capita terms, and institutional
measures will need to be put in place to reach the whole
population, in particular children and other vulnerable
individuals, through a combination of transfers,
emergency employment programmes and the minimum
wage. The evidence indicates that mothers and schools
are often reliable intermediaries for providing aid to
children. Other options can also be explored.
(ii) Bring in the middle class as a target of broader
social policy. Devise education, health, housing and
social security policies that consider the demands and
specificities of the middle class, such as its quest for
upward mobility and its role as a stabilizing segment
in society.
(iii) Focus on the potential (and constraints) for
the poor and the middle class to accumulate and own
assets (housing, access to good quality education,
capital and land). Broader access to asset accumulation
by excluded sectors can help to mobilize hidden
productive potential with positive effects on economic
efficiency and growth.11
(iv) Create and nurture social policy mechanisms
of participation and democratic accountability.
1. Universal versus targeted systems
New principles of social policy aimed at universalizing
benefits may increase the fiscal cost, but may also bring
various economic and political benefits also worth
considering. One rationale for targeting was that the
cost of universal programmes was difficult for fiscally
constrained governments to afford. Another rationale
was the desire to use the scarce resources available to
help the “really poor”, implicitly assuming that the rest
of the population would take care of their social
situation by themselves. An increase in the number of
beneficiaries would clearly increase the total fiscal costs
of various social programmes; however, the
administrative costs of managing a targeted system are
not negligible either.
 In fact, Moene and Wallerstein (1998), in
discussing the Scandinavian case of universal coverage
for social policies, note that managing a universal
system may be less costly (per beneficiary) than
managing a targeted system. Moreover, there are
economies of scale and standardization of payments in
the universal systems that the segmented or targeted
systems do not have. Targeting poses considerable
informational demands on social policy, since the
identification of the “really poor” is not easy. In
addition, reaching the really poor is a complex task
because of lack of administrative capacities to locate
the marginalized, who often reside in remote rural areas
or urban slums). In general, the poor are often weakly
organized. They have an insufficient capacity to
formulate and implement the policies that affect them
and to demand accountability for these policies.
“Borderline cases” are not easy to manage either. For
example, denying benefits to individuals whose
incomes are only marginally above the cut-off criterion
that is used to define the “really poor” may create
understandable frustration and even resentment among
the excluded populations. Moreover, targeting
implicitly identifies the poor as passive beneficiaries,
11 See the various essays in Olin Wright (1998) on “asset-based
redistribution” and its economic and social effects.
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or “victims of the system”, rather than as agents or
citizens with choices and rights (Solimano, 1998).
In principle, more universal social policies, or at
least policies that reach the middle class more forcefully,
could avoid several of these problems associated with
targeting. Given the fiscal constraints involved, social
benefits can be set in terms of an inverse relationship
with the income level of the recipient, although the total
elimination of the benefit at certain income level entails
certain problems, as we have seen.
An important issue is the level of taxation
compatible with universal benefits. In the Scandinavian
system, where social policies are largely universalistic,
the level of direct and indirect taxation is high but the
quality of the social services provided by the State is
also good. In Latin America, taxation is certainly lower
than in the Scandinavian countries (and tax evasion is
greater) but the coverage and quality of public services
are also lower. In general, a targeted system and limited
social benefits involve a lower tax burden than a social
policy whose benefits are more universal. A lower level
of taxation, by releasing income that would otherwise
be paid out in taxes, will enable the individual or
household to be free to choose the providers of
education, health and pensions systems that they like
and pay accordingly. Although individual choice is
certainly a good thing, we cannot ignore the
informational problems (let alone the income problem,
assuming that the beneficiary has the income to pay
for the service) of choosing among private providers
of complex social services in societies, like those of
Latin America, with a still modest tradition of consumer
information and client protection. Also, the
concentration of providers and the limited competition
among them have raised the cost of delivering services.
For example, the fees of private administrators of
pension funds in Chile are notoriously high, owing to
the limited competition and the small number of
administrators in that market (Valdés, 2002).
2. Non-economic implications of universal
social policies
A move to incorporate the middle class as a beneficiary
of social policies may broaden political support for
these policies. Targeted policies highlight a problem of
incentives: the group that receives the benefits (the poor)
is not the same one that pays for them (the middle and
more affluent classes). Policies become more
redistributive and therefore more conflictive. In turn,
if those who pay the cost (i.e. taxes) also receive the
benefits of social policies, their support of those policies
can be expected to increase. Also, the current experience
with expensive social services provided by the private
sector (typically health and pensions) whose benefits
are limited to those with an ability to pay is leading
people to seek alternative systems of delivery that could
offer a more favourable cost-service combination.
In terms of political economy, stable, higher-
income democracies often have a strong middle class
and relatively low levels of inequality (Solimano,
2005b). In contrast, lower- or middle-income countries
often have a weak middle class and more highly
concentrated income distributions. The current pattern
of expensive and better quality social services for the
upper middle class and the rich provided by the private
sector along with under-funded and modest quality
public services for the poor and lower middle class is
socially divisive. The political correlate of this system
is popular dissatisfaction with current policies,
potentially breeding volatile and populist politics. More
universal social policies can strengthen social cohesion
and stabilize politics, thereby favouring social peace
and economic growth in a virtuous circle.
As we mentioned before in discussing new criteria
for social policies, more emphasis should be placed on
asset accumulation and ownership by the poor and the
middle class as another component of renewed social
policies. Sometimes this is called “asset-based
redistribution” although the name is slightly inaccurate.
The political consequences of asset-based redistribution
may take various forms. If the policy is framed in terms
of redistribution of existing assets, this policy can be
politically conflictive, as the owners of capital, land
and other assets will not want to give up the degree of
social control and income that this ownership entails.
Also, asset redistribution creates uncertainty over
respect for property rights in the future that can be
damaging to investment and innovation in a market
economy.
Broader access to wealth accumulation by the poor
and popular classes is a more promising approach in
this regard, as it can be redistributive of the flows of
assets (and not of stocks, which would reduce the zero-
sum element of redistributing existing assets) and boost
economic growth by unleashing more savings and
investment on the part of excluded segments. This can
become a powerful policy, for it empowers the
recipients to successfully enter the job market,
accumulate capital and effectively participate in policy-
making. More democratic asset accumulation could be
expected to have an economic pay-off and a political
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dividend for democratizing the traditionally elitist Latin
American societies. Access to capital by small-scale
entrepreneurs and the poor is a redistributive policy in
a dynamic sense, as it opens up access to capital
accumulation by many individuals with entrepreneurial
talent and a favourable attitude to risk-taking who are
currently hampered by restricted access to capital
markets oriented to large firms and individuals that are
socially well connected. A more democratic access to
finance can benefit the large segment of small and
medium-scale enterprises and the poor who lack assets
and collateral. All these policies, should generate greater
political support, and if properly implemented, can
match social equity with economic growth.
V
Social contracts in Latin America:
final remarks
Slow and volatile growth combined with persistent
social inequality has led to high poverty levels and social
fragmentation in Latin America. A redress of these
social trends requires more growth and less inequality,
among other things. At the same time, the current social
policy approach, based on targeting “the poorest” and
on privatized social services for those who can afford
them, seems to be exacerbating social stratification in
Latin American societies, with adverse effects on
political stability. Problems of information, implementation
and political economy are pervasive both in the practice
of targeting of social benefits and in citizen choice
between privately provided social services, although
these are worthwhile concepts. Moreover, excessive
segmentation in the quality and access of social services
adversely affects the middle class, which pays taxes
but receives reduced and lower quality social benefits.
A new social contract with a greater awareness of the
social and economic rights of the poor and the middle
class as a valid subject of the benefits of social policy
may be a more promising avenue to explore. In order
to be economically feasible, the new social contract
must devise ways to accelerate growth on a sustained
basis, mobilizing savings, investment and innovation
potential from new sources traditionally excluded from
the economic process. It is important to make the middle
class a legitimate subject of social policies and broaden
access by the poor and middle classes to asset and
capital accumulation, since these groups have a
reservoir of productive talent, entrepreneurship and
innovation. Better and more inclusive economic and
social policies will also help support the endemically
weak Latin American democracies by strengthening the
middle class, a traditionally stabilizing force.
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ANNEX
TABLE A.1
Latin America (18 countries): incidence
of poverty and critical poverty a
1980-2002
Percentage of population in:
Year Povertyb Critical povertyc
Totald Urban Rural Totald Urban Rural
1980 40.5 29.8 59.9 18.6 10.6 32.7
1990 48.3 41.4 65.4 22.5 15.3 40.4
1997 43.5 36.5 63.0 19.0 12.3 37.6
1999 43.8 37.1 63.7 18.5 11.9 38.3
2000 42.5 35.9 62.5 18.1 11.7 37.8
2001 43.2 37.0 62.3 18.5 12.2 38.0
2002 44.0 38.4 61.8 19.4 13.5 37.9
Source: ECLAC (2003  p. 50).
a Estimates corresponding to 18 countries of the region  including
Haiti.
b Percentage of population with income below the poverty line.
c Percentage of population with income below the critical poverty
line.
d Total averages are weighted by the shares of urban and rural
populations in total population.
TABLE A.2
Latin America (18 countries): population
living in poverty and critical poverty a
1980-2002
Millions of persons
Year Povertyb Critical povertyc
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
1980 135.9 62.9 73.0 62.4 22.5 39.9
1990 200.2 121.7 78.5 93.4 45.0 48.4
1997 203.8 125.7 78.2 88.8 42.2 46.6
1999 211.4 134.2 77.2 89.4 43.0 46.4
2000 207.1 131.8 75.3 88.4 42.8 45.6
2001 213.9 138.7 75.2 91.7 45.8 45.9
2002 221.4 146.7 74.8 97.4 51.6 45.8
Source: ECLAC (2003  p. 50).
a Estimates corresponding to 18 countries of the region  including
Haiti.
b Population with income below the poverty line.
c Population with income below the critical poverty line.
TABLE A.3
Latin America (12 countries): income distribution by households
1990 - 2002a
Country Year
Share in total Ratio Concentration index
income of: 10%/40% Gini Logarithmic Theil Atkinson
40% poorest 10% richest variance
Argentinab 1990 14.9 34.8 2.3 0.501 0.982 0.555 0.570
1997 14.9 35.8 2.4 0.530 1.143 0.601 0.607
1999 15.4 37.0 2.4 0.542 1.183 0.681 0.623
2002 13.4 42.1 3.1 0.590 1.603 0.742 0.702
Bolivia 1989c 12.1 27.9 2.3 0.538 1.528 0.574 0.771
1997 9.4 27.9 3.0 0.595 2.024 0.728 0.795
1999 9.2 29.6 3.2 0.586 2.548 0.658 0.867
2002 9.5 28.3 3.0 0.614 2.510 0.776 0.865
Brazil 1990 9.5 43.9 4.6 0.627 1.938 0.816 0.790
1996 9.9 46.0 4.6 0.638 1.962 0.871 0.762
1999 10.1 47.1 4.7 0.640 1.913 0.914 0.754
2001 10.2 46.8 4.6 0.639 1.925 0.914 0.760
Chile 1990 13.2 40.7 3.1 0.554 1.258 0.644 0.671
1996 13.1 40.2 3.1 0.553 1.261 0.630 0.667
2000 13.8 40.3 2.9 0.559 1.278 0.666 0.658
Colombia 1994 10.0 41.8 4.2 0.601 2.042 0.794 0.817
1997 12.5 40.1 3.2 0.569 1.399 0.857 0.822
1999 12.3 40.1 3.3 0.572 1.456 0.734 0.945
2002d 11.9 39.1 3.3 0.575 1.413 0.714 0.701
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TABLE A.4
Latin America (12 countries): evolution of GDP  per capita
income and urban unemployment
Country Year Per capita GDP Per capita income Urban Unemployment
(in 1995 US dollars)a (in 1995 US dollars) (percentage)
Argentina 1990 5 545 5 291 7.4
1999 7 435 7 183 14.3
2000 7 283 7 095 15.1
2001 6 875 6 645 17.4
2002 6 055 5 824 19.7
Bolivia 1989 804 821 10.2
1999 941 961 8
2000 941 959 7.5
2001 934 950 8.5
2002 938 930 8.7
Costa Rica 1990 16.7 25.6 1.5 0.438 0.833 0.328 0.539
1997 16.5 27.3 1.7 0.450 0.860 0.356 0.535
1999 15.3 29.4 1.9 0.473 0.974 0.395 0.573
2002 14.5 30.2 2.1 0.488 1.080 0.440 0.646
Ecuadord 1990 16.7 25.6 1.5 0.461 0.823 0.403 0.591
1997 16.5 27.3 1.7 0.469 0.832 0.409 0.510
1999 15.3 29.4 1.9 0.521 1.075 0.567 0.597
2002 14.5 30.2 2.1 0.513 1.031 0.563 0.593
Mexico 1989 15.8 36.6 2.3 0.536 1.096 0.680 0.598
1998 15.1 36.7 2.4 0.539 1.142 0.634 0.599
2000 14.6 36.4 2.5 0.542 1.221 0.603 0.621
2002 15.7 33.2 2.1 0.514 1.045 0.521 0.571
Peru 1997 13.4 33.3 2.5 0.532 1.348 0.567 0.663
1999 13.4 36.5 2.7 0.545 1.358 0.599 0.673
2001 13.4 33.5 2.5 0.525 1.219 0.556 0.636
Dominican
Republic 2000 11.4 38.8 3.4 0.554 1.250 0.583 0.635
2002 12.0 38.3 3.2 0.544 1.216 0.570 0.637
Uruguayd 1990 20.1 31.2 1.6 0.492 0.812 0.699 0.519
1997 22.0 25.8 1.2 0.430 0.730 0.336 0.475
1999 21.6 27.0 1.3 0.440 0.764 0.354 0.483
2002 21.6 27.3 1.3 0.455 0.802 0.385 0.661
Venezuela
(Bolivarian
Republic of) 1990 16.7 28.7 1.7 0.471 0.930 0.416 0.545
1997 14.7 32.8 2.2 0.507 1.223 0.508 0.985
1999 14.6 31.4 2.2 0.498 1.134 0.464 0.664
 2002 14.3 31.3 2.2 0.500 1.122 0.456 0.866
Source: ECLAC (2003  pp. 73-74).
a Country households sorted by per capita income.
b Greater Buenos Aires.
c Eight main cities and El Alto.
d Urban total.
Country Year
Share in total Ratio Concentration index
income of: 10%/40% Gini Logarithmic Theil Atkinson
40% poorest 10% richest variance
TABLE A.3 (continued)
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Country Year Per capita GDP Per capita income Urban Unemployment
(in 1995 US dollars) a (in 1995 US dollars) (percentage)
TABLE A.4 (continued)
Brazil 1990 3 859 3 733 4.3
1999 4 217 4 057 7.6
2000 4 328 4 180 7.1
2001 4 335 4 155 6.2
2002 4 340 4 163 7.1
Chile 1990 3 779 5 311 7.8b
1999 5 631 5 299 9.8b
2000 5 792 5 459 9.2b
2001 5 902 5 475 9.1b
2002 5 952 5 560 9.0b
Colombia 1991 2 158 2 142 10.5
1999 2 272 2 232 19.4
2000 2 288 2 222 17.2
2001 2 282 2 205 18.2
2002 2 277 2 216 17.6
Costa Rica 1990 2 960 2 870 5.4
1999 3 793 3 379 6.2
2000 3 775 3 359 5.3
2001 3 741 3 506 5.8
2002 3 762 3 558 6.8
Ecuador 1990 1 670 1 588 6.1
1999 1 699 1 627 14.4
2000 1 682 1 677 14.1
2001 1 742 1 689 10.4
2002 1 776 1 740 8.6
Mexico 1989 3 925 3 853 2.7
1998 4 484 4 430 3.2
2000 4 813 4 878 2.2
2001 4 720 4 810 2.5
2002 4 690 4 813 2.7
Peru 1990 1 879 1 795 8.3
1999 2 310 2 236 9.2
2000 2 330 2 227 8.5
2001 2 290 2 179 9.3
2002 2 376 2 258 9.4
Dominican Republic 1990 1 378 1 380 …
1998 1 831 2 009 14.3b
2000 2 052 2 207 13.9b
2001 2 079 2 274 15.4b
2002 2 133 2 334 16.1b
Uruguay 1990 4 707 4 577 8.5
1999 5 984 5 917 11.3
2000 5 826 5 668 13.6
2001 5 580 5 413 15.3
2002 4 946 4 778 17.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian 1990 3 045 3 310 10.4b
Republic of) 1999 3 028 3 003 14.9b
2000 3 082 3 519 13.9b
2001 3 130 3 292 13.3b
 2002 2 796 2 929 15.8b
Source: ECLAC (2003, pp. 239-240).
a Refers to the real gross national income per capita.
b National total.
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TABLE A.5
Latin America and the Caribbean (12 countries):
minimum wage and per capita GDP  2002
Country Monthly minimum wage Urban poverty line













Source: ECLAC (2003  p. 200).
a Calculated with the “rf” series of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  with the exception of Guatemala  for which the “wf” series was
used.
b The values of poverty lines around 1999 were converted to 2002 prices on the basis of annually averaged general price index  available
in the online database of IMF (http://imfstatistics.org)  because the food consumer price index  which is more suited to this type of
updating  is not available.
TABLE A.6
Latin America (12 countries): social public spending
(as percentage of GDP)
       
Country 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001
Argentina 19.3 20.1 21.1 20.0 20.8 21.6
Bolivia a … … 12.4 14.6 16.3 17.9
Brazil 18.1 17.7 19.3 17.3 19.3 18.8
Chile 11.7 12.4 12.3 13.0 14.7 16.0
Colombia 6.8 8.1 11.5 15.3 14.0 13.6
Costa Rica 15.6 15.2 15.8 16.8 16.4 18.2
Ecuador b 5.5 5.8 7.4 8.2 8.1 8.8
Mexico 6.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 9.2 9.8
Peru 4.0 5.3 6.7 7.1 7.7 8.0
Dominican Republic 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.6 7.6
Uruguay 16.9 18.9 20.3 21.3 22.8 23.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 8.5 8.9 7.6 8.3 8.4 11.3
Latin America c 10.1 10.9 11.7 12.1 12.8 13.8
Source: ECLAC (2003  p. 176).
a The numbers in the column 1994-1995 correspond to 1995.
b The numbers in the column 1990-1991 correspond to 1991, and in the column 2000-2001 to 2000.
c Simple average of countries  excluding Bolivia and El Salvador. The average for Latin America and the Caribbean, if these countries were
included, would be 11.3%, 11.7%, 12.5% and 13.5% for the columns 1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, and 2000-2001, respectively.
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TABLE A.7
Latin America (12 countries): rate of growth of GDP
and per capita GDP 1980-2003
(exchange rate  in percentages)
Country 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDPa
Argentina -0.49 4.10 -0.83 -4.44 -10.81 5.45
Bolivia -0.42 4.00 2.27 1.65 2.74 2.00
Brazil 3.02 1.77 3.97 1.46 1.39 1.50
Chile 3.42 5.88 4.18 3.17 2.07 3.50
Colombia 3.73 2.61 -0.51 1.92 1.75 4.96
Costa Rica 2.08 5.25 1.79 1.21 2.85 4.21
Ecuador 2.15 2.43 0.88 5.46 3.80 1.50
Mexico 2.11 3.41 6.73 -0.29 0.83 1.50
Peru 0.09 3.26 2.72 0.22 4.87 3.45
Dominican Republic 3.62 4.62 7.32 2.99 4.33 -1.00
Uruguay 1.07 3.20 -1.93 -3.54 -10.74 -2.50
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) -0.70 2.62 3.77 3.48 -8.99 -13.00
Average 1.64 3.59 2.53 1.11 -0.49 0.96
GDP per capitab
Argentina -1.33 2.74 -2.04 -5.60 -11.88 4.19
Bolivia -3.00 1.60 -0.10 -0.67 0.41 -0.27
Brazil 0.92 0.29 2.63 0.17 0.12 0.25
Chile 2.33 4.26 2.86 1.89 0.85 2.29
Colombia 1.69 0.65 -2.29 0.15 0.01 3.20
Costa Rica -1.36 2.68 -0.46 -0.89 0.81 2.26
Ecuador 1.04 0.27 -1.00 3.55 1.95 -0.26
Mexico -0.22 1.61 5.10 -1.77 -0.63 0.07
Peru -0.97 1.42 1.08 -1.33 3.29 1.93
Dominican Republic 1.17 2.82 5.53 1.30 2.63 -2.59
Uruguay 0.41 2.47 -2.63 -4.23 -11.38 -3.16
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) -2.50 0.38 1.78 1.54 -10.67 -14.57
Average -0.15 1.77 0.87 -0.49 -2.04 -0.55
       
Source: Prepared by the author.
a In millions of 1995 US dollars.
b Millions of people at mid-year.
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